El Rito and the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo
When the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo was signed on February 2, 1848, El Rito was already a growing village. Hispano families had been settling there since about 1808, cultivating fields and raising livestock. The treaty therefore belongs to the story of how El Rito’s future changed, rather than how the village began. It placed an established community under a new government, with promises of protection that residents would spend decades trying to make secure.
Many early settlers had come from the Abiquiú area. They called their community El Rito Colorado after the creek, and by the early 1830s they were building San Juan Nepomuceno. Their homes, farms, and church predated American sovereignty. The surrounding country had a much longer Indigenous history, including the ancestral Tewa community of Sapawe. Neither the village nor the land around it began with the arrival of the United States.
The treaty ended the war between Mexico and the United States. For Mexican residents of the transferred territory, Articles VIII and IX offered important assurances: protection of property, religious freedom, and a path to American citizenship. Residents could remain or leave while retaining or disposing of their property. Those who stayed without declaring their intention to retain Mexican nationality within the specified year were considered to have chosen American citizenship, although Congress retained authority over admission to full citizenship rights.
For rural families, property protection concerned the means of making a living. A house and an irrigated field were only part of what sustained a household. Livestock needed pasture, and families depended on surrounding resources. Forest Service researchers have documented how rejected claims, missing or inconsistent records, and sometimes an inability to pay taxes contributed to the loss of northern New Mexico community lands under American rule.
The difficulty was turning the treaty’s promise into ownership that the new government would recognize. In 1854, Congress established the office of the Surveyor General of New Mexico to investigate Spanish and Mexican land claims and recommend action. In 1891, it created the Court of Private Land Claims. Older grants and inherited property now faced federal proceedings that could determine which claims would survive.
El Rito entered this struggle through residents such as Jesús María Vigil. On October 22, 1883, Vigil petitioned Surveyor General Henry M. Atkinson on behalf of himself and other interested parties. He sought recognition of a grant he said had been given around 1780 to his great-grandfather, Joaquín García. That earlier date describes Vigil’s claim about a grant; it should not be confused with the village’s generally accepted settlement date around 1808.
An 1892 lawsuit brought the consequences down to the scale of individual property. In Grant v. Jaramillo, one side relied on a United States patent obtained through a homestead entry. The opposing claimant asserted ownership and cultivation extending back to 1825 and invoked the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo. No original grant papers were produced. The territorial supreme court upheld the judgment favoring the patent holder, explaining that the older claim could not prevail through that proceeding. Decades of occupation and an appeal to the treaty had not provided an effective defense.
The larger Town of El Rito claim also remained unconfirmed. A later federal review listed it among claims that were not pursued through the Court of Private Land Claims, recording the reason as unknown. This concerned recognition of the claimed grant; it did not mean that every resident immediately lost a home.
Elsewhere in the Río Arriba, the period following the treaty brought new settlement. The Tierra Amarilla villages provide a clearer example of community creation under American government. Following congressional confirmation of the grant in 1860, Francisco Martínez distributed farming allotments with rights to use surrounding common lands. National Register research places permanent settlement around 1860–1861 and records 122 allotments between 1860 and 1866, identifying communities including Los Ojos, La Puente, and Brazos. Families moving from older settlements such as Abiquiú helped establish these villages. The treaty supplied the changed political setting; later decisions and the settlers’ work produced the communities.
Even there, recognition brought complications. Congress confirmed Tierra Amarilla as an individual grant. Subsequent sales of common lands produced disputes and the loss of settlers’ rights to use them. Nearby Petaca and Cañón de Chama experienced a different restriction: federal decisions recognized individual allotments while excluding much of the larger claimed territory. The federal accounting recorded roughly 186,977 acres claimed at Petaca and 1,392 awarded; at Cañón de Chama, approximately 472,737 acres claimed became about 1,423 awarded. These are comparisons of claims and awards, rather than proof that every claimed acre was legally owned.
Commerce also changed the region. Army supply contracts supported merchants around Tierra Amarilla, and the railroad’s arrival at Chama in 1880 connected the valley more closely with outside markets. Manufactured goods became easier to obtain, while wool and lumber moved outward. These developments unfolded over decades through government policy, investment, and local enterprise; they cannot be credited to the treaty alone.
Seen through these records, the treaty’s significance for El Rito lies in the distance between a promise of security and the effort required to obtain it. Families had established the village before 1848. Afterward, residents such as Vigil sought recognition from a government whose decisions could reshape their relationship to the land. Their petitions and lawsuits preserve the human meaning of that change: the effort to keep an existing community rooted in the place its families called home.
Treaty guarantees and the loss of community lands after 1848
El Rito History Project
The Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo promised that the transfer of New Mexico to the United States would respect existing property. For communities such as El Rito, the question after 1848 was whether that promise would protect the land and resources on which their lives depended.
Article VIII allowed Mexican residents of the transferred territory to remain or leave while retaining or disposing of their property. It also protected property belonging to Mexicans living elsewhere. Article IX promised protection of liberty, property, and religion while residents who chose American citizenship awaited admission to its full rights.
The original Article X addressed land grants directly: grants made by Mexico or other competent authorities would retain the validity they would have possessed under Mexican rule. President James K. Polk recommended deleting it, partly because of concerns about Texas land titles. The Senate removed it before ratification.
That deletion did not erase Articles VIII and IX. In the Protocol of Querétaro, American representatives assured Mexico that removing Article X was not intended to annul grants. Legitimate titles could still be recognized in American tribunals. The United States did not treat this assurance as restoring Article X to the treaty. Much therefore depended on what American tribunals would recognize as a legitimate title.
Congress established the Surveyor General of New Mexico in 1854 to investigate claims under Spanish and Mexican laws, usages, and customs and recommend decisions to Congress. In 1891, Congress created the Court of Private Land Claims. Securing recognition therefore depended on navigating institutions established years, and then decades, after the treaty. [4]
Documents became a serious obstacle. Forest Service researchers have described legitimate claims rejected because records were lost, incomplete, or inconsistent. A family’s long history of farming or ranching could survive in the community while the evidence needed to secure recognition did not.
Shared lands were especially vulnerable. A household could depend on an irrigated field together with common pasture and timberland. In United States v. Sandoval (1897), concerning San Miguel del Vado, the Supreme Court interpreted unallotted lands as remaining under sovereign ownership. It held that neither the settlers nor the town could demand legal title and that the Court of Private Land Claims lacked authority to award it. Claims based on fairness were left to the political branches. Under this reasoning, protecting individual allotments could coexist with denying a community title to the larger commons. That distinction threatened the resources that made small farms viable.
Another limit appeared in Botiller v. Dominguez (1889), a California case. The Supreme Court enforced a federal land-claim statute and stated that it would follow that statute even if it conflicted with the treaty. California’s claims process differed from New Mexico’s, but the reasoning mattered locally: the territorial court later quoted it in an El Rito property dispute.
The El Rito case was Grant v. Jaramillo, 6 N.M. 313, decided by the Supreme Court of the Territory of New Mexico on January 6, 1892
Addressing an argument that a federal land patent violated the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, the territorial court quoted Botiller v. Dominguez, 130 U.S. 238, 247 (1889)
“the court is bound to follow the statutory enactments of its own government.”
In context, the quoted reasoning meant that the court would follow Congress’s land-claim legislation even if it conflicted with the treaty. Any resulting treaty violation was treated as a matter between the United States and Mexico.
In the El Rito dispute, the territorial court also held that any older Spanish or Mexican rights asserted by the claimant were incomplete and required recognition by an authorized tribunal. It upheld the judgment favoring the federal patent holder. The treaty argument did not overcome those procedural and jurisdictional barriers in this lawsuit.
HERE IS THE FULL DECISION IN THE EL RITO CASE:
rant v. Jaramillo
Jan 6, 1892
No. 465
Versions:6 Gild. 3136 N.M. 313
This is an action in ejectment by defendant in error brought in the district court for Rio Arriba county, and on change of venue tried in Santa Fe county, for the possession of a tract of land described in the declaration. To the declaration the defendant below, plaintiff in error here, pleads not guilty, the statute of limitations, and notice as required under section 2270, Compiled Laws, 1884. Issue was joined and trial had at the February, 1890, term, and verdict for the defendant in the court below, and the verdict was set aside by the court, and new trial granted, and tried again at February, 1891, term, at which trial the court directed a verdict, as to the possession, for the plaintiff, and the jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff as to the improvements, and the case is here on a writ of error from the judgment of the court below on that verdict. The defendant in error claims title to the land under a United States patent issued to him on an entry made under the public land laws of the United States by him in the year 1883. The plaintiff in error claims that the title to the land in question is in him, because — First, the land is a part of a grant of land made by the king of Spain in the early part of this century to one Joaquin Garcia, at and comprising the town of El Rito, in Rio Arriba county; second, by virtue of the original deeds and mesne conveyances from his grantors running back to the year 1825; third, by virtue of actual and uninterrupted possession and cultivation of the land by him and his grantors continuously since the year 1825 to the commencement of this suit; fourth, that if the grant was made to Joaquin Garcia, but has since been lost or destroyed, then his grantors had a title under the Mexican government, such as should be recognized by the laws of this country under the treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, and the land was reserved from sale and the patent was issued without authority of law, and is void; fifth, that, if there never was a grant made to Joaquin Garcia by the kingdom of Spain or Mexico, his grantors, by virtue of their occupation and cultivation, had title under decrees of Mexico made to. them confirming the lands to occupiers and cultivators of the crown lands or public domain; sixth, his grantors had title by prescription, by long-continued possession, and cultivation under the Spanish and Mexican laws, such as should be recognized under the stipulations in the treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo.
• The instruction is as follows: “If the jury shall find from the evidence that about the year 1825, and prior to the time when the country comprising the territory of New Mexico was ceded by the republic of Mexico to the United States, the land in controversy in this action was held, possessed, and occupied under a claim of ownership by any person or persons, and such lands were by such person or persons improved or cultivated under such claim, and such possession and claim were public, open, and notorious, and this condition continued until the cession of this territory to the United States in 1848, you will be justified from this state of facts, if found by you to exist, in presuming that the person or persons so holding, possessing, occupying, improving, and cultivating such lands, prior to such cession held a grant or cession of such lands from the governments of Spain and Mexico; and if you find that there was such a grant or cession, and if you further find from the evidence’ that the defendant in this cause, prior to the commencement of this action, acquired all the right, claim, title, and interest in the parcel of land in controversy that was had, held, and possessed by the person or persons owning the same at the time of.the cession of this territory to the United States, then your verdict should be for the defendant.”
The questions involved in this case have been fully investigated by the supreme court of the United States in numerous cases, and there is nothing left for us to do but to apply their rulings to the questions involved. In the case of Dent v. Emmeger, 14 Wall. 308, in regard to the claim of Gabriel Cerre by a concession made A. D. 1789 by the then lieutenant governor of Upper Louisiana, the court says: “Titles which were perfect before the cession of the territory to the United States continued so afterward, and were in nowise affected by the change of sovereignty. The treaty so provided, and such would have been the effect of the principles of the law of nations if the treaty had contained no provision upon the subject. According to that code, a change of government, is never permitted to affect preexisting rights of private property. Perfect titles are as valid under the new government as they were under its predecessor. But inchoate rights, such as those of Cerre, were of imperfect obligation, and affected only the conscience of the new sovereign. They were not of such a nature (until that sovereign gave them a vitality and efficacy which they did not before possess) that a court of law or equity could recognize or enforce them. When confirmed by congress, they became American titles, and took their legal validity wholly from the act of confirmation, and not from any French or Spanish element which entered’ into their previous existence‘. The doctrine of senior and junior equities and of relation back has no application in the jurisprudence of such cases. The elder confirmee has always a better right than the junior, without reference to the date of the origin of their respective claims, or the circumstances attending it.”
In order to more clearly understand the meaning of the word “inchoate,” as used in the above opinion, it may be well to refer to the opinion in the case of Burgess v. Gray et al., 16 How. 48. That case involved the same question raised in this case. John Jarrott in 1780, by permission of the officers of the Spanish government, settled on a tract of land in what is now Jefferson county, in the state of Missouri. That he, his heirs and assigns, continued to occupy and cultivate it until the year 1847, when the land was entered at the register’s office by different persons under preemption allowed to them by the officers of the land office. Suit was brought in the circuit court of Jefferson county, Missouri,,in which the plaintiff, by petition, set forth the claim and occupation of the. said Jarrott and his heirs, with deeds of conveyance from the same in succession to the plaintiff; the defendants being the holders of the aforesaid entry titles from the government. The defendants demurred to the petition, which demurrer was sustained, and, on appeal from the judgment, was affirmed by the supreme court of that state (15 Mo. 220) and the plaintiff below appealed to the supreme court of the United States. Under the code, in Missouri, all claims, either in’ law or equity, set forth in the petition, could be determined in the action; and the federal supreme court, in passing on the question, said: “The demurrer admits the truth of the facts stated in. the petition; and consequently, if these facts show that he had any legal or equitable right to the land in question under the treaty with France, or an act of congress, which the state court was authorized and bound to protect and enforce, he is entitled to maintain this writ of error, and the judgment of the state court must be reversed. Now, as regards any equitable and inchoate title which the petitioner may possess under the treaty with France, it is quite clear that the state court had no jurisdiction over it; for it has been repeatedly held by this court that, under that treaty, no inchoate and imperfect title derived from the French or Spanish authorities can be maintained in a court of justice, unless jurisdiction to try and decide it has first been conferred by an act of eongress. * * * The court had’ no jurisdiction upon the question; and the judgment of the state court can not be reversed unless the plaintiff can show that he had a complete and perfect title derived from the Spanish or French authorities, or a legal or equitable title under the laws of the United States. * * * Neither can the petition be maintained upon the long and continued possession held by the petitioner, and those under whom he claims. The legal title to this land, under the treaty with France, was in the United States. The defendants are in possession, claiming title from the United States, and with evidence of title derived from the proper officers of the government. It is not necessary to inquire whether the title claimed by them is valid or not. The petitioner, as appears by the case he presents in his petition, has no title of any description, derived from the constituted authorities of the United States, of which any court of justice can take cognizance; and the mere possession of public lands, without title, will not enable the party to maintain a suit against anyone who enters on it; and more especially he can not maintain it against persons holding possession under the title derived from the proper officers of the government. He must first show a right in himself before he can call into question the validity of theirs. Whatever equity, therefore, the plaintiff may be supposed to have, it is for- the consideration and decision of congress, and not for the courts. If he has suffered injury from the mistake or omission of the public officer, or from his own ignorance of the law, the power to repair it rests with the political department of the government, and not the judicial. It is expressly reserved to the former by the act of congress.” Certainly no such jurisdiction has been given to the district courts of this, territory, especially in view of the fact that congress has made very ample provisions by creating a court with the exclusive jurisdiction to try and determine the validity of such claims. But, even in cases where the court has the jurisdiction, claims like that set up by the plaintiff in error could not be maintained against a person holding a patent from the United States in a proceeding of ejectment.
In Steel v. Smelting Co., 106 U. S. 447, the court says: “Until set aside or enjoined, it must, of course, stand against a collateral attack with the efficacy attending judgments founded upon unimpeachable evidence. So with a patent for land of the United States, which is the result of the judgment upon the right of the patentee by that department of the government to which the alienation of the public lands is confided, the remedy of the aggrieved party must be sought by him in a court of equity, if he possess such an equitable right to the premises as would give him the title if the patent was out of the way. If he occupy with respect to the land no such position, as this, he can only apply to the officers of the government to take measures in its name to vacate the patent or limit its operation. It can not be vacated or limited in its proceedings where it comes collaterally in question. It can not be vacated or limited by the officers themselves ; their power over the land is ended with the patent issued and placed on the records of the department. This can be accomplished by regular judicial proceedings, taken in the name of the government for that special purpose. It does not follow that the officers of the government would take such proceedings even if the charges of fraud and the use of false testimony in obtaining the patent were true. They might be satisfied that the patentee was entitled to the patent upon other testimony, or that further proceedings would result in a similar conclusion, and that, therefore, it would be unwise to reopen the matter. In any event, whether the officers of the government have been misled by the testimony produced before them or not, the conclusions reached by them are not to be submitted for consideration to every jury before which the patent may be offered in evidence on the trial of an action. As we said in the case of Smelting Co. v. Kemp, “it is this unassailable character (of the patent) which gives to it its chief, indeed its only, value, as a means of quieting its possessor in the enjoyment of the lands it embraces. If intruders upon them could compel him, in every suit for possession, to establish the validity of the action of the land department, and the correctness of its ruling upon matters submitted to it, instead of being a means of peace and security, would subject-his rights to constant and ruinous litigation. He. would recover one portion of his land if the jury were satisfied that the evidence produced justified the action of that department, and lose another portion, the title whereto rests upon the same facts, because another jury came to a different conclusion. So his rights in different suits upon the same patent would be deter-’ mined, not by its efficacy as a conveyance of the government, but according to the fluctuating prejudices of different jurymen, or their varying capacities to weigh evidence.”
In regard to the contention that the sale of the land and issuance of the patent were in violation of the treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, to a like question in the case of Botiller v. Dominguez, 130 U. S. 247, the supreme court says: “Two propositions under this statute are presented by counsel in support of the decision of the supreme court of California. The first of these is that the statute itself is invalid, as being in conflict with the provisions of the treaty with Mexico, and violating the protection which was guaranteed by it to the property of Mexican citizens owned by them at the date of the treaty; and. also in conflict with the rights of property under the constitution and laws of the United States, so far as it may affect titles perfected under Mexico. The second proposition is that the statute was not intended to apply to claims which were supported by a complete and perfect title from the Mexican government, but, on the contrary, only to such as were imperfect, inchoate, and equitable in their character, without being a strict legal title. With regard to the first of these propositions, it may be said that, so far as the act of congress is in conflict with the treaty with Mexico, that is a matter in which the court is bound to follow the statutory enactments of its own government. If the treaty was violated by this general statute enacted for the purpose of ascertaining the validity of claims derived from the Mexican government, it was a matter of international concern, which the two states must determine by treaty, or by such other means as enables one state to enforce upon another the obligations of a treaty.’ This court, in a class of cases like the present, has no power to set itself up as the instrumentality for enforcing the provisions of a treaty with a foreign nation which the government of the United States, as a sovereign pówer, chooses to disregard.”
The proposition that the grantors of the plaintiffs in error derived their title from the decree of the Spanish courts relative to crown lands passed in 1813 is equally untenable, under the rulings of tbe supreme court in the case of U. S. v. Vallejo, 1 Black, 541. It is held that the decree of the Spanish cortes, being inapplicable to the state of things which existed in Mexico after the revolution of 1820, could not have continued in force unless expressly recognized by the Mexican congress, and not then without being essentially modified. The Spanish system of disposing of public lands was very different from that provided for by the Mexican law of 1828. The two laws being repugnant and inconsistent, the former was repealed. The laws of 1824 and the regulations of 1828 are the only laws of Mexico on the subject of granting public lands in the territories, except those regulating towns and missions. It is evident that, if the plaintiff in error has any rights to the land in question growing out of the Spanish and Mexican claims set up by him, they are of an inchoate character, and, according to the decisions of the supreme court above referred to, are such as are reserved by congress to be determined by the political department of the government, or by such tribunal as may be, by an act of congress, authorized to try and determine them; and it is equally’ clear that this court has not been clothed with such authority. The rulings of the court below, which are assigned as error, being in accord with the decisions of the supreme court of the United States upon the question involved, the judgment below will be affirmed.
O’Brien, O. J., and Freeman and MoFie, JJ., concur.